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Abstract
We describe the epidemiology of a protracted nosocomial clonal outbreak due to multidrug-resistant IMP-8 producing Klebsiella oxytoca
(MDRKO) that was ﬁnally eradicated by removing an environmental reservoir. The outbreak occurred in the ICU of a Spanish hospital from
March 2009 to November 2011 and evolved over four waves. Forty-two patients were affected. First basic (active surveillance, contact
precautions and reinforcement of surface cleaning) and later additional control measures (nurse cohorting and establishment of a minimum
patient/nurse ratio) were implemented. Screening of ICU staff was repeatedly negative. Initial environmental cultures, including dry surfaces,
were also negative. The above measures temporarily controlled cross-transmission but failed to eradicate the epidemic MDRKO strain that
reappeared two weeks after the last colonized patients in waves 2 and 3 had been discharged. Therefore, an occult environmental reservoir
was suspected. Samples from the drainpipes and traps of a sink were positive; removal of the sink reduced the rate number but did not stop
new cases that clustered in a cubicle whose horizontal drainage system was connected with the eliminated sink. The elimination of the
horizontal drainage system ﬁnally eradicated the outbreak. In conclusion, damp environmental reservoirs (mainly sink drains, traps and the
horizontal drainage system) could explain why standard cross-transmission control measures failed to control the outbreak; such reservoirs
should be considered even when environmental cultures of surfaces are negative.
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Introduction
Outbreaks caused by multidrug-resistant (MDR) Klebsiella spp.
are a growing worldwide problem. Such outbreaks occur more
frequently (but not exclusively) in intensive care units (ICUs)
[1], have been associated with signiﬁcant mortality [2] and are
usually clonal [3–6], although different clones or species
sharing epidemic plasmids have also been described [7,8]. Most
importantly, the implementation of recommended infection
control measures [9] is often not enough to fully control the
outbreaks, so that many evolve over long periods of time or
even spread to other healthcare centre [6,10]. Speciﬁcally, the
medical literature has not drawn enough attention to the
potential importance of environmental reservoirs during
complex outbreaks, because they have been considered less
important than the reservoir formed by colonized patients
[5,7].
We report a prolonged clonal outbreak of nosocomial
infection due to a multidrug-resistant strain of Klebsiella oxytoca
(MDRKO), which was previously characterized as the ﬁrst
IMP-8-producing Enterobacteriaceae in Spain [11], with the aim
of describing its epidemiological features and the control
measures implemented; we emphasize our ﬁnding that iden-
tifying and isolating an environmental reservoir was key for the
eradication of this outbreak.
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Materials and Methods
We followed the recommendations of the ORION statement
for reporting outbreaks [12].
Setting
The study was conducted in La Merced Hospital, a 240-bed
community public centre in Osuna, Seville (Spain). The
hospital has an eight-bed medical and surgical ICU (with
three additional beds in an adjoining room to be occupied
if necessary), which receives ~350 admissions annually.
The structure of the ICU is shown in Fig. 1. The water
supply and wastewater removal system comprised 11 sinks
(labelled S1 to S11 in Fig. 1); each sink drained into
a wastepipe (W), labelled according to the number of
the sink, except for: S6 and S7, which shared the same
drainpipe and, together with S5, drained into W5; S8 and
S9, which drained into W7; and S10 and S11, which drained
into W8.
Patients
The investigation included all 42 patients colonized or infected
by the epidemic strain of MDRKO over the outbreak, which
evolved over four waves (Fig. 2). The index case was detected
in March 2009 and the last case in November 2011. Patients
with MDRKO were considered to be infected if presenting
with signs of active infection considered to have been caused
by MDRKO, according to CDC criteria [13], and colonized
otherwise.
Patients, environmental and healthcare staff studies, and
actions taken
Before the onset of the outbreak, all patients with >1 month
stay in the ICU underwent active screening by rectal and
pharyngeal swabbing for colonization with multidrug-resistant
Gram negative bacteria. As described below, an active
screening protocol including weekly and discharge rectal and
pharyngeal swabbing (or tracheal aspirate if under mechanical
ventilation) was started when the outbreak was detected.
During the outbreak, six main environmental investigations
were carried out (Fig. 2 and Table 1). The earlier ones focused
on dry surfaces, while later investigations tended to concen-
trate on surfaces surrounding the patients and damp environ-
ments. The methodology used is described in detail below.
The control measures undertaken during the outbreak are
described in the Results section (the environmental measures
are summarised in Table 1). An additional routine intervention
carried out once a year, the Prevention and Control of Legionella
Infection Protocol (PCLIP), which was non-speciﬁcally imple-
mented because of this outbreak, is described here because of
its potential impact on the evolution of the outbreak. The PCLIP
is applied once a year to treat water supply networks of all
Spanish hospitals. In our centre, this is performed by hyper-
chlorination of the main water tank for 3 h with free residual
chlorine (20–30 mg/L) and hyperchlorination of the terminal
points (1–2 mg/L) for 2 h.
As regards healthcare workers, ICU staff were screened
twice during the outbreak (Fig. 2): in wave 1, a pharyngeal
swab was collected, and in wave 3, pharyngeal and rectal swabs
were collected.
FIG. 1. Plan of the ICU. Grey square:
sink. Grey circle: wastepipe. Discontinous
line: drainpipe. S: sink. W: wastepipe.
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Antimicrobial therapy consumption
With the purpose of investigating the consumption of the main
group of antibiotics in the ICU, they were grouped as follows:
third-generation cephalosporins (ceftriaxone, cefotaxime and
ceftazidime); fourth-generation cephalosporins (cefepime);
fosfomycin; piperacillin/tazobactam; carbapenems (imipenem);
glycopeptides (vancomycin); aminoglycosides (amikacin, tob-
ramycin and gentamicin); tigecycline; and ﬂuoroquinolones
(ciproﬂoxacin and levoﬂoxacin). Consumption was measured
using deﬁned daily doses (DDD) [14] per 100 patient-days.
Microbiological studies
All MDRKO isolates (i. e. isolates showing resistance to
carbapenems) obtained from clinical, surveillance and/or
environmental samples were studied. Screening samples were
seeded onto MacConkey agar plates (Difco, Detroit, MI, USA)
and chromID ESBL (BioMerieux, Marcy L’Etoile, France). From
September 2010, environmental samples were also cultured in
thioglycolate broth (Difco). Identiﬁcation and susceptibility
testing was carried out ﬁrst with an automated system
(MicroScan; Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, West Sacra-
mento, CA, USA). The characterization of the ﬁrst nine
outbreak isolates, obtained between March and August 2009,
was previously reported [11]. In summary, the isolates showed
intermediate susceptibility or resistance to all b-lactams tested
(the MICs of imipenem, ertapenem and meropenem were
2 mg/L, 1–2 mg/L and 0.5–1 mg/L, respectively), and resis-
tance to ciproﬂoxacin, trimethoprim-sulpamethoxazole and
FIG. 2. Synoptic curve of patients colonized and/or infected due to multidrug-resistant Klebsiella oxytoca and control measures. ES (in red):
environmental study. SS (in green): staff study. PCLIP (in blue): Prevention and Control of Legionella Infection Protocol. Discontinuous purple arrow:
basic cross-transmission control measures. Continuous orange arrow: additional cross-transmission control measures. Circle with cross: admission
date of patient. Open circle: discharge date of case. Black circle: date of death of case patient. Grey square: date of ﬁrst isolation of MDRKO.
Discontinous line: ICU stay. Black square: positive environmental culture. White square: negative environmental culture.
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tobramycin; only fosfomycin, colistin and amikacin were active.
The isolates were closely related by pulsed-ﬁeld gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE), and were IMP-8 metallo-b-lactamase pro-
ducers and chromosomal OXY b-lactamase hyperproducers
[11]. K. oxytoca isolated after August 2009 was considered as
belonging to the outbreak clone if it shared the same
susceptibility proﬁle; PFGE was also performed on selected
isolates, including all environmental ones, for conﬁrmation.
Additionally, the susceptibility proﬁles of all K. oxytoca clinical
isolates between February 2008 and February 2009 were
retrospectively investigated.
Statistical analysis
Categorical variables are expressed as percentages and
continuous variables as medians (interquartile range, IQR).
We performed a chi-square test for trend for the incidence
density of colonization/infection by the epidemic strain and for
the percentage of cases detected by means of a rectal swab.
The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to analyse the time between
admission and acquisition of MDRKO, over the ﬁrst three
waves of the outbreak. Wave 4 was not included in the
comparisons because of the low number of cases that
occurred in this last wave. We also studied the trend in
antimicrobial consumption before, during and after the
outbreak. Epi info version 3.5.1 was used.
Results
Overall, 42 (6.4%) of the 660 patients admitted to the ICU
during the outbreak period were colonized/infected by
MDRKO (Fig. 2); of these, 14 (33.3%) developed an infection
(Table 2). The crude mortality of colonized/infected patients
was 44%. The outbreak evolved in four waves (Fig. 2 and
Table 2): from March to May 2009 (nine cases), from
September 2009 to April 2010 (17 cases), from September
2010 to April 2011 (12 cases), and from September to
November 2011 (four cases). The incidence density of
colonization/infection due to MDRKO decreased during
successive waves from 1.91 (wave 1) to 1.24 (wave 2) and
0.82 (wave 3) cases per 100 patient-days. The percentage of
cases that were detected by means of a rectal swab increased
from 55.5% in wave 1 to 88.2% in wave 2 and 83.3% in wave 3
(p 0.02). The average time between admission and acquisition
of MDRKO was 8 days (IQR, 6–37), 16 days (12–27) and 14
days (9–40) in waves 1, 2, and 3, respectively (p 0.22).
K. oxytoca isolates before the onset of the outbreak
The bimonthly average number of K. oxytoca isolated in the
whole hospital during 2008 was 2.08 cases, but during
January–February 2009, just before the outbreak started,
eight K. oxytoca strains were isolated from different patients.
Of these, three were isolated from ICU patients; one of
them, isolated from a patient who was admitted to the ICU
from 10 December 2008 to 5 February 2009, was an
ESBL-producer but was fully susceptible to carbapenems.
These isolates were not available for further microbiological
studies.
Antimicrobial consumption
As shown in Fig. 3, the use of ﬂuoroquinolones, fosfomycin
and aminoglycosides signiﬁcantly increased after the onset of
TABLE 1. Summary of environmental studies and actions
Environmental
study Wave month/year Areas investigated Result Actions
1 1 April/2009 Medical equipment, medical ventilators,
oxygen and air vents in walls, faucets and
ﬁbreoptic bronchoscope.
Negative None
2 2 November/2009 Enteral nutrition preparations, telephones,
tables, computer keyboards, sink surfaces,
monitors, portable medical ventilators,
electrocardiographs and portable
X-ray equipment.
Negative None
3 3 September/2010 Environment surrounding a patient, including
instrument cases, tables, chairs, monitors
and all sink basins.
MBLKO isolated from a
urinary catheter and a
stethoscope around a case.
On 10 September 2010, all
stethoscopes were investigated.
None showed a positive culture
4 3 February/2011 All sink drainpipes and traps MBLKO isolated from
S6 drainpipes and trap
On 25 February 2011, S6 and its
drainage system were permanently
removed. Drainage system of
S7 was replaced
5 3 April/2011 Several surfaces of cubicle 5, the storage
area where S6 had been installed, all
sink traps and main wastepipes
Negative None
6 4 October/2011 S5 (water from faucets, basin, overﬂow
and drainage grille, drainpipes and traps)
Negative S5 and S7 drainpipes connected
to W4. Installation of shut-off
valves in the drainpipe of every
sink to carry out biweekly chemical
cleaning with Biguanida
S5-6-7: sink numbers 5-6-7 in Figure 1. W4: wastepipe 4 in Figure 1.
aAlthough the environmental study was negative, a secondary environmental focus was suspected and it was decided to implement these measures (see text).
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TABLE 2. Main characteristics of the patients colonized and/or infected due to multidrug-resistant Klebsiella oxytoca
Case number/wave Cubicle Sex/Age
Type of
admission
Date sample
(month/day/year)
Type of
sample
Pattern of
acquisition
Discharge
status
1/1a 8 M/53 Medical 03/13/09 TA Colonization Alive
2/1a 7 M/66 Medical 03/16/09 TA Infection (VAN) Dead
3/1a 5 M/75 Medical 03/18/09 TA/RS Colonization Dead
4/1a 1 M/75 Surgical 03/24/09 RS Colonization Dead
5/1a 5 M/37 Medical 04/04/09 TA Infection (VAN) Dead
6/1a 3 M/42 Medical 04/05/09 TA Colonization Alive
7/1a 3 M/45 Medical 05/04/09 TA/RS Colonization Alive
8/1a 6 M/80 Medical 05/10/09 PS Colonization Alive
9/1a 6 M/62 Medical 05/20/09 RS Colonization Alive
10/2 7 M/79 Surgical 09/07/09 B Infection (bacteraemia) Dead
11/2 8 M/47 Medical 09/29/09 TA Colonization Dead
12/2 7 M/63 Medical 10/02/09 TA/RS Infection (VAN) Alive
13/2 4 M/83 Medical 10/08/09 RS Colonization Dead
14/2 5 F/78 Medical 10/15/09 TA/RS Colonization Dead
15/2 6 F/71 Medical 10/27/09 RS Colonization Alive
16/2 1 F/41 Medical 11/03/09 RS Colonization Alive
17/2 5 M/67 Medical 11/10/09 TA/RS Infection (VAN) Alive
18/2 4 M/77 Medical 11/17/09 TA/RS/U Urine tract infection Dead
19/2 8 F/79 Surgical 11/17/09 RS Colonization Dead
20/2 8 F/52 Medical 12/02/09 TA/RS/B Infection (bacteraemia) Alive
21/2 8 F/80 Medical 12/03/09 TA/RS/B Infection (bacteraemia) Dead
22/2 1 F/50 Medical 12/16/09 TA/RS/B Infection (bacteraemia) Dead
23/2 2 F/61 Medical 01/26/10 RS Colonization Alive
24/2 3 M/74 Surgical 03/03/10 RS Colonization Alive
25/2 5 F/82 Medical 03/16/10 RS Colonization Dead
26/2 6 F/66 Medical 04/20/10 RS Colonization Alive
27/3 4 F/80 Medical 09/01/10 AS Colonization Alive
28/3 4 F/76 Medical 08/23/10 TA Infection (VAN) Dead
29/3 6 M/58 Surgical 08/27/10 RS Colonization Alive
30/3 1 M/75 Medical 10/06/10 RS Colonization Alive
31/3 2 M/79 Medical 10/26/10 RS Colonization Alive
32/3 1 F/59 Medical 12/09/10 RS Colonization Dead
33/3 5 M/68 Medical 01/12/11 TA/RS Infection (VAN) Dead
34/3 1 M/47 Medical 02/01/11 RS Colonization Alive
35/3 2 F/62 Medical 02/01/11 TA/RS Infection (VAN) Dead
36/3 7 M/70 Medical 02/22/11 RS Colonization Alive
37/3 5 M/57 Medical 03/15/11 RS Colonization Dead
38/3 5 M/76 Medical 04/19/11 RS Colonization Alive
39/4 5 F/76 Medical 09/03/11 Ascites Infection (peritonitis) Alive
40/4 3 F/69 Medical 09/20/11 TA Colonization Alive
41/4 7 F/63 Medical 09/23/11 TA/RS Colonization Alive
42/4 NA M/68 Surgical 11/04/11 B Infection (bacteraemia) Alive
M, man; F, female; TA, tracheal aspirate; RS, rectal swab; PS, pharyngeal swab; B, blood culture; U, urine culture; AS, axilla swab; VAN, ventilator-associated pneumonia; NA, not
applicable.
aPreviously published data [11].
FIG. 3. Consumption of antimicrobial
before, during and after the outbreak in the
intensive care unit, Hospital La Merced,
Osuna, Seville, Spain. DDD: deﬁned daily
dose.*p <0.05.Aminoglycosides: amikacin,
tobramycin and gentamycin. Carbapenems:
imipenem. Fluoroquinolones: ciproﬂoxacin
and levoﬂoxacin.Third-generationcephalo-
sporins: ceftriaxone, cefotaxime and ceftaz-
idime. Fourth-generation cephalosporins:
cefepime. Glycopeptides: vancomycin.
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the outbreak (the latter two were used to treat some patients
infected with MDRKO). In contrast, the use of third-gener-
ation cephalosporins decreased. During the outbreak there
was a non-signiﬁcant reduction in the consumption of carba-
penems and a non-signiﬁcant increase in the consumption of
piperacillin-tazobatam and tigecycline.
Description of the outbreak and control measures
Wave 1. On 19 March 2009, two MDRKO strains were
isolated from the clinical samples of two patients admitted to
adjacent ICU cubicles (7 and 8). Immediately, an infection
control task force was formed. The basic control measures
undertaken, which were repeated during later waves (Fig. 2),
included: (i) active screening of all patients admitted to the
ICU; (ii) contact precautions in individual cubicles for colo-
nized/infected patients; (iii) reinforcement of standard
cross-transmission control measures; (iv) periodic educational
sessions; and (v) implementation of twice daily thorough
cleaning. All surfaces except medical devices were cleaned with
bleach (1:10 dilution of 5.25% sodium hypochlorite). Medical
devices were cleaned with Biguanid (ﬁrst generation quater-
nary ammonium) at 1.6%. These disinfectants were tested in
vitro at the used concentrations and showed inhibition of
MDRKO growth (data not shown). The ﬁrst nine isolates were
submitted to a reference laboratory (Hospital Universitario
Virgen Macarena, Seville) and the clonal nature of the outbreak
was shown [11]. All screening samples taken from staff (SS1)
and the environment (ES1) were negative (Fig. 2). The PCLIP
was carried out in the hospital on 5 June. In July 2009, the last
MDRKO-colonized patient still remaining in the ICU in this
wave was transferred to another hospital; as no new cases had
been detected by then, the outbreak was thought to have been
eradicated.
Wave 2. In late August 2009, the last affected patient of wave 1
was readmitted to the ICU. Although contact precautions
were implemented from admission, MDRKO was isolated
from the blood culture of another patient in early September,
and cross-transmission from the previous patients was
suspected. All basic measures were immediately reactivated;
however, new cases emerged. In November 2009, expert
external advisors from the Hospital Universitario Virgen
Macarena recommended ‘additional measures’ that were
implemented, including: nurse cohorting; establishment of
minimum nurse/patient and auxiliary/patient ratios of 1:2 and
1:2.5, respectively; review of the clean/dirty circuit; and
reviewing the use of broad spectrum antibiotics. A second
environmental study (ES2) was performed, with negative
results. In April 2010, the last case in this wave was detected.
The ICU and the adjoining room were left empty, walls were
painted, medications removed and fomites (medication vials,
gloves and containers) eliminated. On 4 June 2010, the annual
PCLIP was carried out in the hospital. The outbreak was again
considered to be over.
Wave 3. In late August 2010, after 4 months with no cases,
MDRKO was again isolated from the clinical sample of a
patient who had been admitted for only 4 days. It was noticed
that a patient, who was then in the Internal Medicine ward, had
previously spent a lengthy period in the ICU; this patient was
screened and detected as colonized, and thus was considered
the probable index case for the third wave. All basic and
additional measures were again implemented. ICU staff were
screened again (SS2) and all cultures were negative. During the
third environmental study (ES3), a urinary catheter removed
from a colonized patient and a stethoscope used with that
patient yielded MDRKO. Because in February 2011 the
outbreak was still out of control, a fourth environmental
study (ES4), which included sinks drainpipes and traps, was
carried out. Only samples from S6 were positive, showing
countless colonies of MDRKO that were cultured from every
pipe, trap and drainage grille sample taken; samples from the
faucet or overﬂow grille were negative. Samples from the pipe
connecting S6 and S7 were also positive. On 25 February 2011,
S6 and its drain system were permanently removed and the
drain system of S7 was replaced. However, another two
patients admitted to adjacent cubicle 5 acquired MDRKO in
March and April 2011 (18 and 53 days after the environmental
intervention). A ﬁfth environmental study (ES5) was carried
out, including surfaces in cubicle 5, the adjacent storage area
where S6 used to be and all the sink traps and main wastepipes
of the unit (Table 1). The 18 samples taken were negative. No
new cases emerged in the following months. On 17 June 2011,
the annual PCLIP was performed and the outbreak was once
again considered eradicated.
Wave 4. On 3 September 2011, MDRKO was again isolated
from the clinical sample of a patient admitted to cubicle 5. All
patients admitted were screened again; two further colonized
cases were detected. A sixth environmental study (ES6) was
undertaken, involving 11 samples taken from S5 (faucets,
surfaces, overﬂow hole, drainage grilles, drainpipes and trap);
all were negative for MDRKO. In spite of that and because of
the high suspicion of a hidden reservoir, in October 2011 the
infection-control task force decided to isolate W5, which S5
and S7 still drained into. Thus, the complete horizontal
drainage system of S5 and S7 was replaced and connected up
to W4. Shut-off valves were also installed to each sink drainage
system. Since then, a disinfection of the drainage system is
performed twice a week using Biguanid at 1.6% for 30 min
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(through closing the valves), followed by opening the valves
and running hot water (70°C) for 5 min. On 4 November
2011, MDRKO was isolated from blood cultures in a patient
admitted to the surgical ward. This patient and the index case
for wave 4 who was discharged from the ICU on 25
September 2011, shared healthcare staff in the surgical ward;
therefore it was assumed that he had acquired MDRKO during
his stay in the surgical ward. Three and 6 months after the end
of the outbreak, unannounced transversal screening studies of
both patients and the environment were carried out, and were
negative. Screening of patients with a >1 month ICU stay was
resumed. No new strains of K. oxytoca have been detected in
the hospital, as of April 2013.
Concerning the isolates not included in the earlier report
[11], their susceptibility proﬁles were identical to the previous
ones. blaIMP-8 was detected by PCR in all 17 isolates from wave
2, and they all showed an identical PFGE proﬁle to the
epidemic strain from the ﬁrst wave. Selected isolates from
waves 3 and 4 and all the environmental samples were studied
for the presence of blaIMP-8 and molecular relatedness by PFGE
proﬁle. Every strain studied carried blaIMP-8 and they showed
the same PFGE proﬁle as previous isolates.
Discussion
We described one of the most prolonged nosocomial
outbreaks due to carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella spp.,
which was eradicated, that to our knowledge has been
described to date [1,3–8,15–18]. Since the outbreak was due
to a clonal strain in a small unit that rarely admits patients from
other centres, it represented an excellent model for evaluating
the complex evolving nature of its epidemiology. Our results
show that control measures aimed at preventing cross-trans-
mission were partially effective but were unable to deﬁnitively
eradicate the outbreak strain; this, together with the epide-
miological data, strongly suggests the key role of an environ-
mental reservoir, at least during the later waves of the
outbreak.
The outbreak strain was previously characterized as the
ﬁrst IMP-8-producing Enterobacteriaceae in Spain [11]. We do
not know how the carbapenemase gene entered the hospital.
Because the number of non-MDR K. oxytoca isolates dramat-
ically increased just before the outbreak, it may be hypothe-
sized that the epidemic clone was spreading before acquiring
the IMP-8 gene, which probably increased the chances of
spreading in the context of high antibiotic use; unfortunately,
K. oxytoca strains isolated before the outbreak were not
available for typing. This hypothesis follows the theory that
spread of ‘susceptible’ (or not MDR) clones may sometimes be
the ﬁrst stage of outbreaks caused by MDR bacteria if such
clones eventually acquire MDR genes [19]. We also hypoth-
esize that the gene codifying for the IMP-8 was introduced into
the ICU by a colonized patient.
Colonized patients are the most important reservoir and
patient-to-patient cross-transmission is considered to be the
main mechanism of spread in outbreaks of nosocomial
infection caused by multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae [9].
However, it is recognized that standard infection control
measures are frequently not enough to eradicate outbreaks
[4,6,20]. In our case, basic control measures failed and
additional measures including nurse cohorting (which was
effective in other similar outbreaks [4,6]) had to be imple-
mented. Nevertheless, the epidemic strain was not eradicated
and the last waves occurred long after the last colonized
patients from previous waves had been discharged. This
previously observed phenomenon [3,20] may raise the suspi-
cion of an unrecognized human or environmental reservoir
that enabled the outbreak strain to survive in spite of the
preventive measures to stop cross-transmission. Nevertheless,
staff and patient surveillance studies did not identify any human
long-term carrier.
Identifying potential environmental reservoirs has often
been neglected, so that few authors to date have reported
environmental studies when describing earlier outbreaks
[1,3,4,6]. There are no standardized recommendations about
when, where and how environmental sampling should be
performed. Many of the environmental studies reported have
in fact usually been carried out on dry surfaces [6].
MDR-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae has been recovered from
beds and various medical devices [1,6] and even from
contaminated roll boards [16]. K. oxytoca has also been
recovered from ventilator surface cultures [21]. We also
found the MDRKO outbreak strain on medical instruments in
the vicinity of an affected patient. However, all isolates taken
from dry surfaces could merely reﬂect breaks in standard
control measures. A stable reservoir could also be established
in a moist environment where suitable conditions might favour
the formation of microbial bioﬁlms [20–24]. We found an
environmental reservoir of this kind in the trap and pipes of S6
during wave 3 (Figs 1 and 2). Because of the results of
environmental cultures and the association of the cases during
that wave with cubicle 5, we think that a change in the
epidemiology of the outbreak occurred, evolving from a
predominantly patient-related reservoir during the ﬁrst wave
(although we cannot discard water drain system involvement)
to an environmental one.
Importantly, contaminated sinks and drainage systems are
becoming more frequently identiﬁed as relevant reservoirs of
MDR Gram-negative bacteria, including Acinetobacter baumannii
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[23], Pseudomonas aeruginosa [24] and recently also ESBL-pro-
ducing K. oxytoca [20]. Contaminated water (i.e. used for staff
hand washing, hygiene of patients or washing devices) is
drained through the sinks; bioﬁlm-forming bacteria may form
stable reservoirs in the waste pipes and even in the semi-hor-
izontal drain pipes if they are not inclined enough or are
partially blocked. Water splashing from the faucets creates an
aerosol effect from the sink’s drain, which may later contam-
inate the basin and surrounding surfaces [23,24]. In our
outbreak, removing the S6 and S7 drainage system failed to
completely eradicate the outbreak strain; even though we had
eliminated the S6 reservoir, S5 remained connected to the S6
pipe and to W5 (Fig. 1), and new cases occurred in cubicle 5. It
was only when the horizontal drainage system to S5 was
removed and S5 and S7 were connected to W4 that the
outbreak was ﬁnally brought under control. We think that S5
was also a reservoir that could not be detected.
Finally, an unintended action may have played an important
role in the epidemiology of the outbreak. In the ﬁrst three
waves, the emergence of new cases was stopped, coinciding
with the application of the PCLIP, only to remerge a few
months later (Fig. 2). This would suggest that the PCLIP may
have had a signiﬁcant but not decisive impact on the
contaminated drainage systems, perhaps because it was unable
to completely eradicate the bacterial bioﬁlms. Chemical
disinfection of the drainage system has been previously
reported to have had little impact on the bacterial burden in
attempts to solve similar problems [20,24].
In conclusion, the epidemiology of outbreaks due to
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae may be complex
and evolving; even when the main reservoirs are formed by
colonized patients, and cross-transmission is the principal
means of their spread, alternative reservoirs should be
suspected if strictly applied traditional control measures are
not efﬁcacious. In these circumstances, a wet environmental
reservoir (mainly the drain, trap and horizontal drainage
system of a sink) should be considered. Finally, initiatives
standardizing environmental investigations in healthcare set-
tings should be encouraged.
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